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President's Page 
Phillip Becker and the Right to Privacy 
If Screwtape 1 were writing letters in the 1970's, he might well 
boast of the diabolical discovery of a constitutional "right to privacy." 
Beginning with Griswold us. Connecticut, which has led to the virtual 
displacement of parents by Planned Parenthood social engineers in the 
influencing of adolescent sexual mores, the "right" which was undis-
covered for almost two centuries has been carried to incredible 
extremes by the Burger court. The right of privacy in abortion 
decision-making has been carried far beyond the original excesses of 
Roe us. Wade and Doe us. Bolton. Not only have parents lost their 
right to participate in their children's decision-making, but husbands 
have lost the privilege of influencing their own child's possibility of 
survival, health departments have lost their right to regulate the per-
formance of abortion, and, if the Dooling decision is sustained, Con-
gress will have lost its right to disburse funds for abortion through the 
Hyde Amendment. 
Another locus for the "right to privacy" has been expounded by 
the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Karen Quinlan case - the right 
to privacy in refusing treatment. While no one would want to deny 
any competent patient the right to refuse extraordinary care , the 
precedent established by the Quinlan decision has some profoundly 
disturbing implications for proxy consent. No one questions the sin-
cerity or the good motivation of the Quinlan family, however the 
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court transcends the circum-
stances of the Quinlan case. In effect, the court states that next of kin 
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may exercise for incompetent patients a "constitutional right to 
privacy." The danger of this solution is that it disenfranchises the 
attending physician in those situations where the decision of the next 
of kin may be lethal to the patient and where the medical treatment 
recommended is neither extraordinary nor futile. This poses a formid-
able obstacle for any attending physician who may wish to retain 
control over circumstances where near relatives may "want the patient 
dead for the wrong reasons." 2 The famous Johns Hopkins case in 
which surgery was denied for duodenal atresia because the patient had 
Down's Syndrome is paradigmatic of this kind of situation. 3 In reach-
ing its decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey did not say that the 
attending physicians in the Quinlan case were wrong in applying the 
standards of good medical practice. It did not even say that the lower 
court was wrong in sustaining the physicians in their action. The Court 
merely asserts that it will not be "bound or controlled" by medical 
standards in intervening on behalf of a right to privacy. This judicial 
tyranny is carried a step further by the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Council in the Saikewicz case. In that decision the court said that 
proxy decision-making for every incompetent in the state belonged 
exclusively to the court and "that responsibility is not to be entrusted 
to any other group purporting to represent the 'morality and con-
science of our society,' no matter how highly motivated or impres-
sively constituted." This decision now attempts to move life-and-death 
decision-making away from family, physicians, or guardians and to 
locate it as a matter of what amounts to judicial privacy. Here again, 
the issue is not whether the court was or was not correct in recom-
mending that Saikewicz (who was a 67 year old Down's Syndrome 
patient in Belchertown State Hospital) should not receive chemo-
therapy for leukemia. In reaching that conclusion, the court was either 
wrong or right for the wrong reasons. 
It is perhaps too facile to see a logical progression from the Johns 
Hopkins case to the New Jersey Supreme Court decision to the 
position of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Council. All involved 
proxy consent for incompetents and all involved serious implications 
for the role of the physician in such decision-making. It is not merely 
paranoid to see an erosion of the physician's contribution nor is it suf-
ficient to point out that, in some instances, the physician has freely 
abdicated his role to the court. This issue arises again in the Phillip 
Becker case. 
The case of Phillip Becker in California raises questions of great 
poignancy. The medical facts are very difficult to weigh and both the 
medical testimony and the judicial opinions raise profoundly dis-
turbing questions. At issue was the question of whether Phillip, a 12 
year old Down's Syndrome child, should have cardiac surgery for an 
intraventricular septal defect. Since surgery had been delayed , the 
child had developed pulmonary hypertension creating an expected 
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mortality of about 5% for the procedure. The pediatric cardiologist, in 
recommending th~ procedure, pointed out that Phillip was unusually 
bright for a child with Down's Syndrome "falling into the top 5-10% 
of such children in terms of educational potential." Phillip was 
described as being able to feed and dress himself, fold laundry, feed 
the cat, and make his bed. Without the surgery, he could be expected 
to deteriorate in adolescence and to die by the third decade of life. 
Although the indication for surgery cannot be said to be incontro-
vertible, the reasons presented in court for withholding surgery were 
most unfortunate. A pediatrician (who was himself the father of a 
retarded child) stated that he did not feel the surgery should be done 
"with the goal of increasing the life expectancy of a life that I con-
sider devoid of those qualities that give it human dignity." The sim-
ilarity of language to that of early theorists of the Third Reich4 is par-
ticularly unfortunate. Phillip's father, who emerges from the transcript 
as a most anguished parent, testified under questioning that he 
thought his son would be "better off dead than alive." His reason for 
this conclusion was his fear that the child would be consigned to a 
"warehouse institution" after his parents had died and were unable to 
provide for quality care. This presumption of low standards of care for 
the indigent retarded would be a very tragic element to be accepted 
where life and death decisions were being made for the handicapped. 
Facilities for ·the care of the retarded have only recently emerged from 
the bedlam-like standards of the 1940's and 1950's and it would be 
regressive if a court were to accept as a "given," the notion that the 
choice for institutionalized mental defectives is either death or life 
under deplorable conditions. 
A petition to make Phillip a ward of the Juvenile Court for the pur-
pose of giving consent for the surgery was denied by Juvenile Court 
Judge Eugene Premo. In oral remarks, he cited nearly plenary rights of 
parents in denying consent. It would appear that Judge Premo, in reach-
ing his decision, had required a higher standard of proof of the need for 
surgery than what would have been applied to a situation involving a 
juvenile of normal intelligence. The judge ruled that there was not 
"clear and convincing" evidence that the surgery was needed and that 
the child would survive and benefit from the operation. Attorneys for 
the California Pro-Life Council pointed out that the usual standard 
used in such cases involving juveniles was proof by "preponderance 
of the evidence." A California appeals court, however, ruled that the 
correct standard of proof had been used and that the 5-10% risk of 
mortality was an "unreasonable" one. 
It would be most unfortunate if this case should become a prece-
dent for a double standard of proof. If it is concluded that a normal 
person is allowed to take a higher risk than a handicapped child or 
adult in a similar situation, then not only Phillip Becker but a whole 
class of citizens have had their rights eroded. 
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The recurrence of cases involving patients with Down's syndrome is 
symptomatic of the diminished citizenship of such persons whether at 
Johns Hopkins, in Belchertown, or in California in the case of Phillip 
Becker. Some authors have described terms such as "sanctity of life" 
or "worth of every individual" as "talismanic incantations" which 
interfere with analysis and enlightenment. If we prescind from such 
judgments, however, we are left with the unbelievably tortured cir-
cumlocution of those who have prejudged the quality of life of the 
child or adult with Down's Syndrome. Killing the child with Down's 
Syndrome in utero, after viability but before birth, becomes the "pre-
vention" of Down's Syndrome in medical parlance. If we decide that 
the Down's Syndrome patient should not survive because of his intel-
lectual limitations, then therapy becomes his enemy and any poten-
tially fatal disease becomes his friend. This is obvious in the com-
mentary on Saikewicz in particular. We are told, for example,5 that if 
his "leukemia is left undisturbed, Saikewicz will die relatively quickly 
without pain or discomfort." When one reads such a statement, it is 
questionable why we would ever want to treat any patient with 
leukemia. Without belittling the complications of therapy, no one who 
has spent any time on a busy hematology-oncology service would ever 
describe death from leukemia in such sanguine, sugar-coated terms. 
There are situations incontrovertibly where irrational vitalism has led 
to the use of toxic modes of therapy in a manner which merely pro-
longs and exacerbates the dying process. These situations are the same 
for the patient with Down's Syndrome as in the normal patient. It is 
fair to say that Joseph Saikewicz could "understand" his therapy as 
well as any two year old leukemic of normal intelligence and probably 
" cooperate" as well in the carrying out of the therapy (that is to say, 
to resist and react to all that is painful) . If we decide to withhold 
therapy for Joseph Saikewicz, it is because he is like any other old 
man for whom a transient remission is of questionable risk/benefit 
indication. Similarly, the decision for surgery on Phillip Becker should 
not be qualified by a suspicion that the society will not do right by 
him if he happens to outlive his father. Phillip Becker will be denied 
equal access to medical care unless his life is "sacred" and possessed of 
irreducible value. 
REFERENCES 
1. Lewis , C. S., Scre wtape Letters (New York: Macmillan Co., 197 3 ). 
2. Hughes , G. J ., "Killing and Le tting Die," The Month , F eb. , 1975 , p. 44. 
3. Diamond, E. F., " Quinlan Decision Misinterpreted by Critics ," Hospital 
Progress, 57:6, 1976. 
4. Binding, K. and Hoche, A., The Release of the Destruction of Life Devoid of 
Value (Leipzig: Felix Meiner Publishers, 1920). 
5. Paris, J. J., "Withholding Life Supporting Treatment from the Mentally 
Incompetent," Linacre Quarterly 45: 237, 1978. 
106 Linacre Quarterly 
